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Protecting Against Untrusted Relays: An
Information Self-encrypted Approach
Hao Niu, Yao Sun, and Kaoru Sezaki
Abstract—The reliability and transmission distance are gener-
ally limited for the wireless communications due to the severe
channel fading. As an effective way to resist the channel fading,
cooperative relaying is usually adopted in wireless networks
where neighbouring nodes act as relays to help the transmission
between the source and the destination. Most research works
simply regard these cooperative nodes trustworthy, which may
be not practical in some cases especially when transmitting
confidential information. In this paper, we consider the issue
of untrusted relays in cooperative communications and propose
an information self-encrypted approach to protect against these
relays. Specifically, the original packets of the information are
used to encrypt each other as the secret keys such that the
information cannot be recovered before all of the encrypted
packets have been received. The information is intercepted only
when the relays obtain all of these encrypted packets. It is proved
that the intercept probability is reduced to zero exponentially
with the number of the original packets. However, the security
performance is still not satisfactory for a large number of
relays. Therefore, the combination of destination-based jamming
is further adopted to confuse the relays, which makes the
security performance acceptable even for a large number of
relays. Finally, the simulation results are provided to confirm the
theoretical analysis and the superiority of the proposed scheme.
Index Terms—Cooperative communications, untrusted relays,
information self-encryption, intercept probability
I. INTRODUCTION
The widespread use of wireless devices motivates more
research attention on the technologies of wireless communi-
cations. Compared to the cable systems, wireless communica-
tions suffers a lot from the channel fading. Diversity technique
is thus usually used to resist the channel fading, e.g., bit-
interleaving in time domain and multiple-input and multiple-
output (MIMO) in spatial domain. From the pioneering work
of [1], [2], the cooperative communications has been studied
extensively as an emerging scheme to harvest the spatial
diversity gain, which does not need multiple antennas at the
devices and thus is more flexible. By exploiting other nodes in
the network to act as the relays, multiple transmission links can
be provided to improve the transmission reliability. In addition,
multi-hop transmission can be also performed through the
cooperation to realize the communication between the source
and the destination, when they are not in the coverage area of
each other.
Exploiting cooperative communications to improve the
transmission security is also a heating topic in terms of
physical layer security (PLS). Different from the cryptograph,
PLS utilizes the channel fading to realize perfect secrecy from
the perspective of information theory [3]–[8]. Briefly speaking,
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the confidential information can be transmitted securely at a
secrecy rate, which is limited by the difference between the
channel capacities of the legitimate link and the eavesdrop-
ping link. The maximum achievable secrecy rate is called
as secrecy capacity. The PLS realizes perfect secrecy even if
the eavesdropper has infinite computing power. The research
works [9]–[16] analyze how to enhance PLS, i.e., improve the
secrecy capacity or reduce the secrecy outage probability (the
probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity is less than
a target secrecy rate), through the cooperative communications.
Among them, [9]–[12] combine relay selection with cooper-
ative jamming while [13]–[16] only employ relay selection
technique.
However, all of these works assume that the cooperative
relays are trustworthy and do not consider the information
leakage at the relays. In practical networks, the relays may be
untrusted. That is, they are willing to provide their resources
to assist the transmission but at the same time they also
intend to decode the transmitted information. In [17] and
[18], the authors study this issue and propose a destination-
based jamming (DBJ) scheme to achieve a positive secrecy
capacity in the cooperative networks with an untrusted relay.
[19] considers the MIMO nodes and designs a joint secure
beamforming scheme to resist the untrusted relay. In [20],
the secrecy outage probabilities with an untrusted relay is
analyzed for different cooperation schemes. The optimal power
allocation is employed in [21] for the secure transmission
in untrusted relay systems. In addition, references [22]–[24]
further analyzes the cooperative communications with multiple
untrusted relays.
The works in [17]–[24] focus on the perfect secrecy
through the PLS, which is not necessary in many applications.
Therefore, we exploit the fountain codes for secure wireless
transmission in [25] and release the requirements of PLS.
The scheme exploits an important fact that, in fountain-coded
transmissions, any receiver must obtain sufficient numbers of
coded packets to recover the original source information. If
the destination can accumulate the packets more quickly than
the eavesdropper, the security will be guaranteed. In [25], we
noted that the channel fading itself is competent to achieve
this goal if the average channel condition of the source-
destination link is superior to that of the source-eavesdropper
link. Otherwise, transmit power control is executed to yield
a higher packet reception rate at the destination. We in this
paper attempt to introduce this kind of security concept to
resist untrusted relays. Due to the characteristics of fountain
coding, however. Eve can still decode a small number of
original packets before enough fountain packets are obtained.
An revised coding scheme to overcome this drawback is thus
2proposed first. Then, the application of the revised coding
scheme in cooperative networks to resist untrusted relays is
analyzed for different cooperation protocols. Specifically, Our
contributions are listed as follows,
1) A new secure coding scheme with linear complexity is
designed, which avoid the information leakage caused by
the fountain codes before enough packets are received
correctly. The proposed coding scheme can be used
to relax the strict requirements of PLS, and thus the
transmission can be realized according to the ordinary
channel capacity instead of the secrecy capacity.
2) The security performance (intercept probability) is de-
rived when applying the proposed scheme in the un-
trusted relay networks. The intercept probability is
proved to be reduced exponentially with the number
of the original packets. In addition, it is observed
that adopting cooperation achieves a better performance
compared to treating the cooperative users as pure
eavesdroppers. The DBJ scheme is then found to be
optimal and its security performance is acceptable even
for a larger number of relays.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system
model is introduced in Section II. Section III describes the
proposed coding scheme and further analyzes its secrecy
and complexity performance. The application of the proposed
scheme in untrusted relay systems is considered in Section IV
and the intercept probabilities for direct transmission, decode-
and-forward (DF) protocol, amplify-and-forward (AF) proto-
col and DBJ are derived. The numerical results are provided
to evaluate the theoretical analysis and the superiority of the
proposed scheme in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes
the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The considered cooperative network with untrusted relays
is as shown in Fig. 1, which consists of one source (S), one
destination (D) and K untrusted relays (denoted by a relay
set R= {R1,R2,...,RK}). All of the nodes are operated in a
half-duplex mode with a single antenna. S intends to deliver a
confidential information to D through packet-based wireless
transmission with the potential cooperation of the relays.
However, the relays are only service level trust but not data
level trust [23], i.e., they attempts to intercept (decode) the
information simultaneously when they are asked to cooperate.
For the worst case, the relays are also supposed to be collusive
with each other.
The transmission links are modelled as the block-flat
Rayleigh fading channels. That is to say, the channel coeffi-
cient huv between node u and node v is a complex circularly
symmetric Gaussian variable with mean zero and variance σ2uv .
Meanwhile, huv remains constant during the transmission of
one packet and varies independently among different packets.
S and the relays (if cooperation is selected) transmit the
packets with power P and a target rate R bits per channel
use (bpcu). The noise at each receiver is represented by the
additive white Gaussian noise with varianceN0. Therefore, the
received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for the link between node
S
D
R
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Fig. 1. Cooperative networks with untrusted relays
u and node v is written as γuv = ρ|huv|
2
, where ρ = P/N0.
The γuv follows an exponential distribution with parameter
λuv =
(
ρσ2uv
)−1
.
The original packets of the confidential information are
denoted by (I1, I2, ..., IN ). For the direct transmission, the
instantaneous achievable rate at D can be expressed as
CD = log2 (1 + γSD) (1)
Considering that the capacity-approaching code is adopted at
the physical layer, D receives In correctly if CD ≥ R. The
system uses basic automatic repeat-request (ARQ) mechanism
to ensure D obtain all of the packets, in which the receivers
simply discard the erroneous packets. The relays are treated
pure eavesdroppers and the achievable rate of the relay Rk is
Ck = log2 (1 + γSk) (2)
Since the relays are collusive, they can share their obtained
information. For simplicity, we assume that one original packet
is intercepted if any relay decodes it correctly and the mutual
information accumulation among the relays is not considered.
Therefore, the packet In is intercepted if max
Rk∈R
{Ck} ≥ R.
If the cooperation mode is decided, the relays assist the
transmission of S but also act as the eavesdroppers at the
same time. As a low complexity scheme to benefit from the
multi-relay cooperation, relay selection strategy is adopted in
which only the best relay is selected to cooperate for every
transmission. The transmission is divided into two phases. In
phase I S broadcasts its packet, and in phase II the selected
relay forwards its received information by either DF or AF
protocol. The achievable rate at D by using the DF protocol
is given by
CDFD = 0.5 log2
(
1 + γSD + max
Rk∈R′
{γkD}
)
(3)
where, 0.5 is due to the spectral loss of cooperative commu-
nications and R′ is the decoding set which includes the relays
that succeed in decoding the transmitted packet. As for the AF
protocol, the achievable rate at D is
CAFD = 0.5 log2
(
1 + γSD + max
Rk∈R
{
γSkγkD
1 + γSk + γkD
})
(4)
The achievable rate at relay Rk in the cooperation mode
is C′k = 0.5Ck. Therefore, it requires max
Rk∈R
{C′k} ≥ R to
intercept one packet.
3III. INFORMATION SELF-ENCRYPTED SCHEME FOR
SECURE COOPERATION WITH UNTRUSTED RELAYS
It can be observed that the relays can easily intercept some
confidential information if the original packets are transmitted
directly. Therefore, an information self-encrypted scheme is
proposed to resist untrusted relays while employing them to
cooperate.
A. Scheme description
Intuitively, the original packets can be pre-processed such
that a certain number of the processed packets are necessary
to recover the original information. And thus the transmission
is secured if the destination receives enough processed packets
faster than the eavesdropper. In our previous work [25], the
fountain coding scheme is adopted to realized this kind of
secure transmission. Due to the characteristics of fountain
coding, however, the eavesdropper(s) can still decode a small
number of original packets before enough fountain packets
are obtained. In this paper, a fixed linear coding scheme
is proposed which achieves a much better information self-
encrypted performance. Specifically, for theN original packets
(I1, I2, ..., IN ), the following N × N generator matrix is
designed,
T =


0 1 1 · · · 1 1
1 0 1 · · · 1 1
1 1 0 · · · 1 1
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
1 1 1 · · · 0 1
1 1 1 · · · 1 0


(5)
Assuming each original packet has K bits, i.e., In =
[i1n, i2n, ..., iKn]
tr, the proposed coding scheme is shown as
[P1, P2, ..., PN ] = [I1, I2, ..., IN ] ∗ T (mod2) (6)
where, the processed packet Pn = [p1n, p2n, ..., pKn]
tr also
has K bits. The scheme can be represented as the following
equation by the bit-wise modulo two operation among the
original packets,
Pn = I1 ⊕ ...⊕ In−1 ⊕ In+1 ⊕ ...⊕ IN =
N∑
l=1
Il ⊕ In (7)
If N is an even number, the generator matrix T has an
inverse matrix T−1 = T . That is to say, the original packets
can be recovered through the same process as the encoding
scheme,
In = P1 ⊕ ...⊕ Pn−1 ⊕ Pn+1 ⊕ ...⊕ PN =
N∑
l=1
Pl ⊕ Pn (8)
Proof. Let’s denote the processed packet set as PN =
{P1, P2, ..., PN}. For a subset with cardinality M (M ≤ N )
PM = {Pm1 , Pm2 , ..., PM} ⊆ PN, the complement is P
C
M
=
PN − PM. The similar denotations are also applied to the
original packet sets IN, IM and I
C
M
.
If a subset PM of the processed packets is received correctly,
then ∑
PM = Pm1 ⊕ Pm2 ⊕ ...⊕ PM
=
(
M
N∑
l=1
Il
)
⊕ Im1 ⊕ Im2 ⊕ ...⊕ IM
where,
(
M
N∑
l=1
Il
)
=
N∑
l=1
Il ⊕ ...⊕
N∑
l=1
Il︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
. Because
(
2
N∑
l=1
Il
)
= 0, we can obtain
∑
PM =

(
N∑
l=1
Il
)
⊕ Im1 ⊕ Im2 ⊕ ...⊕ IM =
∑
I
C
M
,M is odd
Im1 ⊕ Im2 ⊕ ...⊕ IM =
∑
IM,M is even
Therefore, if and only if M is an odd number and N =
M + 1, we can derive an individual original packet
∑
I
C
M
=
I
C
M
= IN − IM since the cardinality of I
C
M
is one in this case.
In other words, we can recover one original packet by P1 ⊕
...⊕Pn−1⊕Pn+1⊕ ...⊕PN = In if and only if N is an even
number.
If the number of the original packets is odd in practical
application, we can simply add a redundant packet to perform
the proposed scheme.
B. Secrecy performance and complexity analysis
1) Shannon perfect secrecy: According to the scheme
description, we can get the following conclusion: if less
than N − 1, N − 1 and N processed packets are obtained
correctly, 0, only 1 and all of the N original packets can
be recovered respectively. As for the recovery of one spec-
ified original packet In, it needs N − 1 processed packets
{P1, ..., Pn−1, Pn+1, ..., PN}. The perfect secrecy of In is
proved to be achieved if less than these N − 1 processed
packets are received.
Proof. In [26], Shannon describes that the perfect secrecy can
be achieved if Pr[M |E ] = Pr[M ] for all M (set of message)
and all E (set of cryptogram). We assume that the source
generates bit streams independently with equal probability1,
such that the secrecy depends on the security of each bit
(bitwise security). The original packets (I1, I2, ..., IN ) are
consequently also independent of each other. For each bit
ikn in the original packet In, Pr[ikn = 0] = Pr[ikn =
1] = 0.5. Since Pn =
N∑
l=1
Il ⊕ In, we can easily derive that
P1, P2, ..., PN are independent as well and for each bit pkn in
the processed packet Pn, Pr[pkn = 0] = Pr[pkn = 1] = 0.5.
Denoting {P1, ..., Pn−1, Pn+1, ..., PN}
∆
= PCn, if a proper
subset PJ ⊂ P
C
n is obtained by the receiver, no information
about In is intercepted. That is because considering any bit ikn
in the original packet In and the corresponding bit pkJ in the
1For unideal sources, this can be realized with a scrambler. The information
of the scrambler may be publicly known, which does not affect the security
performance of the proposed scheme.
4∑
PJ, Pr[ikn |pkJ ] = Pr[ikn] = 0.5 for all ikn ∈ {0, 1} and
pkJ ∈ {0, 1}. That is to say, before all of the packets in P
C
n are
received correctly, the perfect secrecy of the original packet
In is maintained. Therefore, all of the original packets are
perfectly secured (i.e., the perfect secrecy of the confidential
information is ensured) before N − 1 processed packets are
received.
In case we neglect the information leakage caused by one
original packet (only one original packet can be recovered
when N − 1 processed packets are received), it is regarded
that the information is intercepted only if the untrusted relays
obtain all of the N processed packets when the transmission
from S to D is finished. By exploiting the random channel
fading at the physical layer, an arbitrarily small intercept
probability can be realized as N increases. This characteristic
is utilized to resist these untrusted relays and satisfy any
predetermined secrecy constraints, which is analyzed in detail
in next section.
2) Linear complexity: The encoding process can be de-
signed directly based on Eq. (7) that Pn =
N∑
l=1
Il ⊕ In,
in which the
N∑
l=1
Il is calculated first and then each Pn is
derived by the modulo two operation with In. Therefore,
the complexity of the proposed scheme is 2N (i.e., linear
complexity O(N)). The complexity of the decoding process
has the same result.
IV. INTERCEPT PROBABILITY OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, the intercept probability of the proposed
secure cooperation scheme is analyzed. The cooperative net-
works with and without direct link between S and D are both
considered.
A. Cooperative networks with direct link
1) Direct transmission: In this case, the untrusted relays
are not employed and simply treated as the eavesdroppers. The
probability that one received packet is not decoded correctly
at the destination is [27]
εD = Pr {CD = log2 (1 + γSD) < R}
= 1− e−λSDτ = F (λSDτ ) (9)
where, F (χ) = 1− exp (−χ) and τ = 2R − 1. On the other
hand, the relays have the packet error probability
εR = Pr
{
max
Rk∈R
{Ck} = log2
(
1 + max
Rk∈R
{γSk}
)
< R
}
=
K∏
k=1
(
1− e−λSkτ
)
=
K∏
k=1
F (λSkτ ) (10)
The required time slots TD and TR for the destination
and the relays to recover one packet meets the geometric
distribution with parameter 1 − εD and 1 − εR respectively,
i.e., their probability mass function (PMF) and cumulative
distribution function (CDF) are given by
fv (Tv) = ε
Tv−1
v (1− εv) (11)
Fv (Tv) =
Tv∑
tv=1
εtv−1v (1− εv) = 1− ε
Tv
v (12)
To obtain one processed packet, the relays should decode
the packet correctly not after it is correctly received by the
destination through ARQ. Thus, the intercept probability for
one processed packet is calculated as
PI−1 =
∞∑
TD=1
fD (TD)FR (TD)
=
∞∑
TD=1
εTD−1D (1− εD)(1− ε
TD
R ) =
1− εR
1− εDεR
(13)
In order to intercept the confidential information, the eaves-
dropper should receives all of the (P1, P2, ..., PN ) correctly.
The intercept probability is thus derived as
PI = (PI−1)
N
(14)
It is observed that the intercept probability decreases to zero
exponentially as N increases, which means that any arbitrary
small intercept probability can be satisfied by simply increas-
ing the value of N.
2) DF protocol: For the DF cooperation, there should be
some processed packets that D receives directly without the
cooperation of any relays (i.e., the decoding set R′ should be
null set). In this case, the packet error probability of D is
εDFD
= Pr
{
CDFD = 0.5 log2
(
1 + γSD + max
Rk∈∅
{γkD}
)
< R
}
= 1− e−λSDτ
′
= F (λSDτ
′) (15)
where, τ ′ = 22R − 1. Simultaneously, εDFR =
K∏
k=1
F (λSkτ
′).
The secure transmission of one packet is thus obtained as
PDFS−1 =
∞∑
TD=1
fD (TD) (1− FR (TD))
=
∞∑
TD=1
(
εDFD
)TD−1
(1− εDFD )
(
εDFR
)TD
=
εDFR − ε
DF
D ε
DF
R
1− εDFD ε
DF
R
(16)
Therefore, the intercept probability of one packet is
PDFI−1 = 1− P
DF
S−1 =
1− εDFR
1− εDFD ε
DF
R
(17)
The intercept probability of the confidential information is
also
PDFI =
(
PDFI−1
)N
(18)
For mathematical convenience and fair comparison among
different numbers of relays, it is assumed that for all of the λSk
and λkD are identical respectively in this paper, and denoted
that λSk = λSR and λkD = λRD . We can easily derive
PDFI−1(K1) > P
DF
I−1(K2), for K1 > K2 (19)
5from the fact that εR(K1) < εR(K2). Therefore, exploiting
more untrusted relays deteriorates the secrecy performance,
although more diversity gain can be achieved. There is a
tradeoff consideration in practical applications between the
secrecy and diversity performance when employing untrusted
relays. Furthermore, whether to select the cooperation or
not can be also decided by comparing Eq. (13) and Eq.
(17). However, we can still reduce the intercept probability
exponentially by increasing the value of N.
3) AF protocol: It is intractable to obtain the exact intercept
probability of the AF protocol. Therefore, we consider its
upper and lower bounds by using the following inequalities,
γSkγkD
1 + γSk + γkD
≥
γSkγkD
γSk + γkD
−
1
4
≥
1
2
min {γSk, γkD}−
1
4
∆
= γ−AF (20)
and,
γSkγkD
1 + γSk + γkD
≤
γSkγkD
γSk + γkD
≤ min {γSk, γkD}
∆
= γ+AF (21)
where the first equality comes from the result derived in [28].
First the upper bound of the intercept probability is an-
alyzed. We can derive the probability that both D and the
untrusted relays cannot receive a packet correctly as follows,
εAF+R,D = Pr
{
max
k∈R
{γSk} < R, γSD +max
k∈R
{
γ−AF
}
< R
}
= G
(
F (λSRτ
′) ,
λSR
I1
F (I1τ
′)−A1
+
λRD
I1 − λSR
[
F (λSRτ
′)−
λSR
I1
F (I1τ
′)
]
−A2
)
(22)
where,
G (α, β) = K
K−1∑
k1=0
K−1−k1∑
k2=0
[(
K − 1
k1
)
(
K − 1− k1
k2
)
αk1 (−1)
k2 (1− α)
K−1−k1−k2 β
]
I1 = (λSR + λRD) (k2 + 1) + λRD (K − 1− k1 − k2), I2 =
I1 − 0.5λSD, τ1 = 2
2R − 0.75 and,
A1 =
{
λSR [1− F (λSDτ1)]τ
′, I2 = 0
λSR[1−F (λSDτ1)]
I2
F (I2τ
′) , else
A2 =


λRD [1−F (λSDτ1)]
λSR
[F (λSRτ
′)
−λSRτ
′ exp (−λSRτ
′)] , I2 − λSR = 0
λRD [1−F (λSDτ1)]
I2−λSR
[F (λSRτ
′)− λSRτ
′]
, I2 = 0
λRD [1−F (λSDτ1)]
I2−λSR
[F (λSRτ
′)
−λSRI2 F (I2τ
′)
]
, else
(See Appendix A).
Then the probability that only D decodes a packet correctly
is similarly calculated as,
εAF+R,–D = Pr
{
max
k∈R
{γSk} < R, γSD +max
k∈R
{
γ−AF
}
≥ R
}
= G (F (λSRτ
′) , A1 +A2) (23)
Therefore, the intercept probability of one processed packet
can be derived as
PAF+I−1 = 1−
∞∑
TD=1
(
εAF+R,D
)TD−1
εAF+R,–D = 1−
εAF+R,–D
1− εAF+R,D
(24)
And we can obtain the upper bound of the intercept probability
of the confidential information by
PAF+I =
(
PAF+I−1
)N
(25)
On the other hand, the expression of the lower band PAF−I
is similar to PAF+I , and we only need to replace τ1 with τ
′
and set I2 = I1 − λSD. Therefore, the intercept probability
of the confidential information is also reduced exponentially
as the value of N increases. The upper bound of the intercept
probability can be used to decide a suitable value of N to
satisfy any required security level. It is not intuitive to compare
the intercept probabilities for different numbers of relays, and
we will observe the tendency through the numerical results.
B. Cooperative networks without direct link
In some practical networks, the direct link between S and
D is blocked such that the transmission is realized only
through the help of relays. However, it is impossible to
realize the secure transmission by DF protocol since the relays
should decode the packets correctly to forward them. For the
ordinary AF protocol, it is also unusable because for any
relay Rk we have γSk ≥
γSkγkD
1+γSk+γkD
. The relays can always
decode the packets correctly if D does. Therefore, a scheme
called destination-based jamming (DBJ) is widely adopted in
literatures. In this paper, we also combines the DBJ with our
proposed scheme to realize the secure transmission. In DBJ,
the transmit power P in Phase I is allocated between S and D
with parameter α ∈ [1, 0]. S transmits its packet with power
αP and D transmits artificial noise with power (1− α)P
simultaneously. Then the relay forwards the received super-
position signal still with power P . D can subtract the artificial
noise from the received signal since it is generated by itself,
while the relays are confused by it. Therefore, the achievable
rate at the relays and D is derived respectively as [22],
CDBJk = 0.5 log2
(
1 +
αγSk
1 + (1− α) γkD
)
(26)
CDBJD = 0.5 log2
(
1 + max
Rk∈R
{
αγSkγkD
1 + αγSk + (2− α) γkD
})
(27)
First, we calculate the upper bound of the intercept proba-
bility based on the following equations
αγSkγkD
1 + αγSk + (2− α) γkD
≥
1
(2− α)
(
1
2
min {αγSk, (2− α) γkD} −
1
4
)
(28)
αγSk
1 + (1− α) γkD
<
αγSk
(1− α) γkD
(29)
6Let’s denote X1 = αγSk and X2 = (2− α) γkD. If τ2 =(
22R − 1
)
1−α
2−α ≥ 1, we can derive that
εDBJ+R,D = Pr
{
max
Rk∈R
{
X1
X2
}
< τ2,
max
Rk∈R
{min {X1, X2}} < τ3
}
= G
(
λX2
λX2 + λX1τ2
,
λX1
I3
F (I3τ3)
+
λX2
I3
F (I3τ3)−
λX2
I4
F (I4τ3)
)
(30)
and
εDBJ+R,–D = Pr
{
max
Rk∈R
{
X1
X2
}
< τ2,
max
Rk∈R
{min {X1, X2}} ≥ τ3
}
= G
(
λX2
λX2 + λX1τ2
,
λX1
I3
[1− F (I3τ3)]
+
λX2
I3
[1− F (I3τ3)]−
λX2
I4
[1− F (I4τ3)]
)
(31)
where τ3 = 2
[(
22R − 1
)
(2− α) + 0.25
]
, λX1 = λSRα
−1,
λX2 = λRD (2− α)
−1
, I3 = (λX1 + λX2) (k2 + 1) +
(λX2 + λX1τ2) (K − 1− k1 − k2) and I4 = λX1τ2 + λX2 +
(λX1 + λX2 ) k2 + (λX2 + λX1τ2) (K − 1− k1 − k2).
On the other hand, if τ2 < 1,
εDBJ+R,D = G
′
(
1, 1,
(
λX1
λX1 + λX2/τ2
)K−1
λX1
I5
[F (I5τ3)
)
(32)
and
εDBJ+R,–D
= G′
(
1, 1,
(
λX1
λX1 + λX2/τ2
)K−1
λX1
I5
[1− F (I5τ3)]
)
(33)
where,
G′ (ς, β, ϕ) = K
K−1∑
k1=0
[(
K − 1
k1
)
(−ς)k1 βK−1−k2ϕ
]
,
I5 = (λX1 + λX2/τ2) (k1 + 1),
Therefore, the upper bound of the intercept probability of
the confidential information is
PI =
(
PDBJ+I−1
)N
=
(
1−
εDBJ+R,–D
1− εDBJ+R,D
)N
(34)
To derive the lower bound of the intercept probability, the
following inequality is utilized
αγSkγkD
1 + αγSk + (2− α) γkD
≤
1
(2− α)
min {αγSk, (2− α) γkD}
≤
{
γkD, 1© if ασ
2
Sk ≥ (2− α)σ
2
kD
αγSk
(2−α) , 2© if ασ
2
Sk < (2− α)σ
2
kD
(35)
For case 1©, we can derived that
εDBJ−R,D =
Pr
{
max
Rk∈R
{
αγSk
1 + (1− α) γkD
}
< τ ′, max
Rk∈R
{γkD} < τ
′
}
= G
(
1−
λRDe
−λSRτ
′/α
I6
,
λRD
I7
F (I7τ
′)
−
λRDe
−λSRτ
′/α
I8
F (I8τ
′)
)
(36)
and,
εDBJ−R,–D =
Pr
{
max
k∈R
{
αγSk
1 + (1− α) γkD
}
< τ ′,max
k∈R
{γkD} ≥ τ
′
}
= G
(
1−
λRDe
−λSRτ
′/α
I6
,
λRD
I7
[1− F (I7τ
′)]
−
λRDe
−λSRτ
′/α
I8
[1− F (I8τ
′)]
)
(37)
where, I6 = λRD + λSR (1− α) τ
′/α, I7 = λRD (k2 + 1) +
I6 (K − 1− k1 − k2) and I8 = I7 + λSR (1− α) τ
′/α.
Now the attentions turn to the case 2©, we can derive that
εDBJ−R,D = Pr
{
max
k∈R
{
αγSk
1 + (1− α) γkD
}
< τ ′,
max
k∈R
{
αγSk
(2− α)
}
< τ ′
}
= G′
(
1, 1,
1
(k1 + 1)
F
(
(k1 + 1)λSRτ
′
α
))
+
G′
(
I10, I11,
λSRe
λSD
(1−α)
I9 (k1 + 1)
[
F
(
I9 (k1 + 1) (2− α) τ
′
α
)
−F
(
I9 (k1 + 1) τ
′
α
)])
(38)
and
εDBJ−R,–D = Pr
{
max
k∈R
{
αγSk
1 + (1− α) γkD
}
< τ ′,
max
k∈R
{
αγSk
(2− α)
}
≥ τ ′
}
= G′
(
I10, I11,
λSRe
λSD
(1−α)
I9 (k1 + 1)[
1− F
(
I9 (k1 + 1) (2− α) τ
′
α
)])
(39)
where, I9 = λSR +
λRDα
(1−α)τ ′ , I10 =
λSRe
λRD
(1−α)
I9
and I11 =
F
(
λSRτ
′
α
)
+ I10
(
1− F
(
I9τ
′
α
))
.
The lower bound of the intercept probability for both cases
1© and 2© is
PDBJ−I =
(
PDBJ−I−1
)N
=
(
1−
εDBJ−R,–D
1− εDBJ−R,D
)N
(40)
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For the cooperative networks without direct link, any re-
quired security level can be also satisfied by increasing the
value of N.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, the numerical results are provided to validate
the theoretical analysis first, and then some remarkable conclu-
sions are discussed. The simulation environment is established
in a rectangular coordinate system, where the source and the
destination are located at (0,0) and (0,1) respectively. The
position of the relays is generated between the source and
the destination. Without loss of generality, ρ is set to be 20dB
and R = 1bit/s/Hz.
The cooperative network with direct link is considered in
Fig. 2 for K = 1, 2and3, where the locations of the relays
is assumed to be the midpoint between the source and the
destination, i.e., (0.5,0). It can be observed that exploiting
the relays to assist the transmission achieves a better security
performance compared to treating them as the pure eaves-
droppers. More importantly, the intercept probability reduces
to zero exponentially with the values of N by using our
proposed scheme, which can be used to realize the required
security level and is the main superiority compared to the
alternative schemes. However, in accordance with the existing
literatures [22]–[24], the security performance is deteriorated
significantly with more relays (eavesdroppers). For K ≥ 2 it
is almost impossible to make a secure transmission due to the
diversity gain at the relays, which makes us expect the results
of DBJ.
Fig. 3 illustrates the results of intercept probability for the
cooperative networks without direct links, in which the DBJ
strategy is adopted 2. Although the security performance is still
deteriorated with the number of the relays (eavesdroppers),
2Because of the simulation time, only the results with small N values are
given. For the results with large N values, the intercept probability can be
obtained based on the exponential decline principle.
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adopting DBJ results in interference-limited effect on the
relays and thus improves the security performance dramat-
ically. Even for a large number of relays (eavesdroppers),
the intercept probability is acceptable by combining DBJ
with our proposed scheme for large N values. The intercept
probability with different locations of relays (K = 2 and
N = 1000) is given in Fig. 4. It is observed that the intercept
probability is increased as the relays approaches to the source,
which is also an inherent weaknesses of the physical layer
security. However, DBJ still outperforms much better than the
conventional cooperation scheme and achieves an acceptable
security performance.
Due to its significant advantage, only the DBJ is considered
in the following discussions. First, the simulation results
considering HARQ at the receivers is given in Fig. 5. The
intercept probability is nearly the same between the Basic
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ARQ and HARQ receivers. The one reason is that both
the relays and the destination can benefit from the HARQ
protocol. In addition, the worst case that the information
accumulation among the relays is also considered. Although
the information accumulation among the relays deteriorate the
security performance, the intercept probability is still reduced
to zero as N increases.
In Fig. 6, the effect of the alpha on the intercept probability
is shown. It is observed that the intercept probability is
decreased by reducing the value of alpha (i.e., increasing
the interference caused by the jamming signal at the relays).
However, reducing the value of alpha means more power is
provided to generate the jamming signal and thus less power
is available for the information transmission, such that the
information transmission needs more time slots. To satisfy
both the transmission efficiency and security requirement, the
values of alpha and N should be designed jointly.
VI. CONCLUSION
An information self-encrypted scheme is proposed in this
paper to resist untrusted relays in the cooperative networks.
The idea of the proposed scheme is to utilized the original
packets to encrypt each other as the secret key, such that
the receivers need to receive all of the processed packets to
recover the original information. The security is realized if
the eavesdropper cannot obtain all of the processed packets.
The application of this scheme in the untrusted relay networks
is then analyzed. It is shown that the intercept probability is
reduced exponentially with the number of the original packets,
and user cooperation achieves a better performance than direct
transmission. However, the conventional cooperation does not
work well for a large number of relays. To solve this problem,
the DBJ strategy is also combined with our proposed scheme
and a more acceptable security performance is realized. The
numerical results are then given to confirm the analysis. The
proposed scheme can be also combined with other physical
layer techniques, e.g., adaptive power allocation and beam-
forming, to further improve the security performance. It may
be also a valuable topic to consider the proposed scheme with
PLS jointly.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF εAF+R,D
Denoting the relay selected to cooperate is k˙, the derivation
of εAFR,D can be divided into two parts: 1) γSk˙ ≤ γk˙D; 2)
γSk˙ > γk˙D, and
εAF+R,D = ε
AF+
R,D(1) + ε
AF
R,D(2) (41)
Correspondingly,
εAF+R,D(1) =
K∑
k˙=1
Pr
{
max
k∈R
{γSk} < τ
′, γSD +
1
2
γSk˙ < τ1, γSk˙ ≤ γk˙D
}
=
K∑
k˙=1
∫ τ ′
0
λSk˙e
−λ
Sk˙
xe−λk˙Dx
[
1− e−λSD(τ1−
1
2x)
]
∏
k′∈{1,...,K}−{k˙}
(∫ x
0
λSk′e
−λ
Sk′
ye−λk′Dydy+
∫ x
0
λk′De
−λ
k′D
y
∫ τ ′
y
λSk′e
−λ
Sk′
zdzdy
)
dx
= K
∫ τ ′
0
λSRe
−λSRxe−λRDx
[
1− e−λSD(τ1−
1
2x)
]
[
1− e−λSRτ
′
− e−(λSR+λRD)x + e−λSRτ
′−λRDx
]K−1
dx
= G
(
F (λSRτ
′) ,
λSR
I1
F (I1τ
′)−A1
)
(42)
9where,
G (α, β) = K
K−1∑
k1=0
K−1−k1∑
k2=0
[(
K − 1
k1
)
(
K − 1− k1
k2
)
αk1 (−1)
k2 (1− α)
K−1−k1−k2 β
]
F (χ) = 1 − exp (−χ), I1 = (λSR + λRD) (k2 + 1) +
λRD (K − 1− k1 − k2), I2 = I1 − 0.5λSD, τ1 = 2
2R − 0.75
and,
A1 =
{
λSR [1− F (λSDτ1)]τ
′, I2 = 0
λSR[1−F (λSDτ1)]
I2
F (I2τ
′) , else
Similarly, we can derive that
εAF+R,D(2) =
K∑
k˙=1
Pr
{
max
k∈R
{γSk} < τ
′, γSD +
1
2
γk˙D < τ1, γSk˙ > γk˙D
}
= G
(
F (λSRτ
′) ,
λRD
I1 − λSR
[F (λSRτ
′)
−
λSR
I1
F (I1τ
′)
]
−A2
)
(43)
where,
A2 =


λRD [1−F (λSDτ1)]
λSR
[F (λSRτ
′)
−λSRτ
′ exp (−λSRτ
′)] , I2 − λSR = 0
λRD [1−F (λSDτ1)]
I2−λSR
[F (λSRτ
′)− λSRτ
′]
, I2 = 0
λRD [1−F (λSDτ1)]
I2−λSR
[F (λSRτ
′)
−λSRI2 F (I2τ
′)
]
, else
Then, the εAFR,D is obtained by combining Eq. (41), Eq. (42)
and Eq. (43).
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